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INTRODUCTION

“If Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom
can’t. And the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn’t
that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?”
- Chief Justice Roberts at Obergefell v. Hodges oral argument1
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is unlawful
to discriminate in employment against an individual, “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”2 The scope of
the prohibition on “sex” discrimination has consistently been
expanded over time by statute and case law to recognize new bases and
forms of discrimination.3 Since 2012, the Equal Employment and
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has maintained that gender identity
discrimination is an actionable form of sex discrimination for Title VII

1. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015)
(No. 14-556). Chief Justice Roberts posed this question to the respondent, the Ohio
Department of Health, which refused to allow Mr. Obergefell to be listed as the
surviving spouse on his husband’s death certificate. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct.
2584, 2594 (2015). Counsel offered two responses. Transcript of Oral Argument at 62,
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556). First, that banning same-sex marriage
imposed an equal burden on classes of both men and women. Id. Second, that Tuan
Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001), supported some legal distinctions based on sex
if they related to biology. Id. This moment and the subsequent argument generated
significant speculation that Chief Justice Roberts would concur in Obergefell on sex
discrimination grounds. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Gender Bias Issue Could Tip Chief
Justice Roberts into Ruling for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/30/us/gender-bias-could-tip-chief-justice-robertsinto-ruling-for-gay-marriage.html [https://perma.cc/TA77-BZWK]. Ultimately, this
issue failed to appear in either the Obergefell majority opinion or any of the four
dissents, including the one authored by Chief Justice Roberts. See generally Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Instead, the Chief Justice read his Obergefell dissent
from the bench, which was the first time he had done so in his ten-year tenure. See
Amber Phillips, John Roberts’s Full-Throated Gay Marriage Dissent, WASH. POST
(June 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/06/26/johnrobertss-full-throated-gay-marriage-dissent-constitution-had-nothing-to-do-with-it/
[https://perma.cc/PB9Q-U4MC].
2. Unlawful Employment Practices, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964).
3. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978) (adding
pregnancy discrimination to Title VII’s definition of “sex” discrimination); see also
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66–67 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment
and a hostile working environment as forms of sex discrimination).
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purposes.4 In 2015, the EEOC concluded that sexual orientation
discrimination was also a cognizable form of sex discrimination.5 Two
circuit courts, the Seventh and the Second Circuit, have since also
adopted this interpretation.6 On April 22, 2019, the Supreme Court
agreed to consider these most recent expansions by granting certiorari
in three cases: Altitude Express v. Zarda and Bostock v. Clayton
County, Georgia, which address sexual orientation discrimination, and
R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, which addresses
gender identity discrimination.7 The Court heard oral arguments in all
three cases on October 8, 2019.8
Hively v. Ivy Tech and Zarda v. Altitude Express are two circuit
decisions that embrace an interpretation of Title VII that includes
sexual orientation protections.9 Both cases involved gay employees
who were fired because of their sexual orientation.10 The plaintiffs
relied on some combination of three different theories in order to
advance the claim that sexual orientation discrimination necessarily
constitutes sex discrimination. The first is a comparative “but-for” test,
which asks whether the injured plaintiff would have been treated
differently if their sex were changed.11 The second theory is
“associational” discrimination, an analogy to Loving v. Virginia and
racial discrimination, which suggests that discrimination based on the
sex of one’s partner constitutes discrimination based on one’s own
sex.12 The third theory is that discrimination against sexual minorities
is a form of sex stereotyping, which is already actionable under Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, either because sexual minorities often violate

4. Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC DOC 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995 (Apr. 20,
2012).
5. Baldwin v. Dep’t of Transp., EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (July
15, 2015).
6. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018); Hively v. Ivy
Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
7. See Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019); Bostock v. Clayton
Cty., 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S.
Ct. 1599 (2019); Amy Howe, Court to Take Up LGBT Rights in the Workplace
(Updated),
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr.
22,
2019),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/04/court-to-take-up-lgbt-rights-in-the-workplace/
[https://perma.cc/JL26-T3NU].
8. Adam Liptak & Jeremy Peters, Supreme Court Considers Whether Civil Rights
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
8,
2019),
Act
Protects
L.G.B.T.
Workers,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/08/us/politics/supreme-court-gay-transgender.html
[https://perma.cc/4FAR-5NYS].
9. See generally Zarda, 883 F.3d 100; Hively, 853 F.3d 339.
10. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 110; Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
11. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
12. Id. at 334. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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strict gender stereotypes or, more broadly, because being nonheterosexual is inherently a violation of sex stereotypes.13
While each of these theories was sufficient to link discrimination
against their gay or lesbian plaintiffs in those specific factual contexts,
they are not conceptually broad enough to consistently capture
discrimination that targets bisexuals, asexuals, and other nonmonosexual orientations. These orientations do not necessarily pass
desire through the lens of sex and therefore make poor comparators,
can lack associations, or conform with stereotypes. This underinclusivity is not trivial, as bisexuals alone constitute a majority of the
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) community.14
These theories are also conceptually distinct from those addressing
whether transgender people are also covered by Title VII, despite the
fact that the vast majority (up to 85%) of transgender people do not
identify as heterosexual.15 If these limitations are not addressed, a
favorable rule may not effectively capture all sexual orientation
discrimination, and that under-inclusivity may help LGBT opponents
argue that sex and sexual orientation discrimination are not necessarily
linked phenomena for the purposes of Title VII.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of Title VII’s prohibition on
sex discrimination, tracing the additions of pregnancy discrimination,
sexual harassment, and sex stereotyping as cognizable forms of sex
discrimination over time. Part II then evaluates the three theories
advanced by Hively and Zarda — comparators, association, and
stereotyping — focusing on their shortcomings in the face of particular
sexual orientations. Finally, Part III advances additional rationales to
conceptually link sex and sexual orientation discrimination without
reinforcing “monosexism.”16 This Note argues that effective capture

13. Hively, 853 F.3d at 346.
14. Approximately 1.7% of all Americans identify as lesbian or gay, whereas 1.8%
of the population identifies as bisexual. GARY GATES, WILLIAMS INST., HOW MANY
PEOPLE ARE LGBT? 1 (2011), https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wpcontent/uploads/Gates-How-Many-People-LGBT-Apr-2011.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5CZQ-2CU3].
15. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, THE REPORT OF THE 2015 U.S.
TRANSGENDER
SURVEY
59
(2016),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M5TS-YKXJ].
16. “Monosexism” refers to:
[A]n essentialist perception of sexual orientations as solely occurring
between members of same or different genders . . . . Any sexuality that blends
same and different gender interactions is deemed illegitimate, occurring in a
state of sexuality confusion, an experimental phase, or that bisexual persons
are somehow dishonest about their orientation, attractions, and their identity.
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of all sexual orientations by Title VII’s protections requires a rejection
of tests that look for a disparate impact between men and women,
which would also eliminate the so-called “bisexual harasser” defense
to sexual harassment claims.17
The cases before the Supreme Court are not isolated incidents. Of
the nearly 11 million LGBT people in the United States, 88% are
employed.18 Twenty-five percent report experiencing discrimination
in the workplace in the past year.19 Gay men and lesbian women on
average receive less income than their heterosexual counterparts, and
22% of LGBT persons report not being paid or promoted at the same
rate as their colleagues.20 LGBT people live in all parts of the country,
even constituting up to 5% of the United States’ rural population,
where LGBT persons may need to travel further for services where
they still face discrimination.21 However, the impacts of these cases are
more acutely felt in cities22 because 80% of LGBT Americans live in
suburban or urban areas.23
I. THE EVOLUTION OF TITLE VII’S PROHIBITION ON
DISCRIMINATION “BECAUSE OF” SEX
Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination, like its prohibitions on
racial or religious discrimination, does not enumerate specific
Tangela S. Roberts et al., Between a Gay and a Straight Place: Bisexual Individuals’
Experiences with Monosexism, 15 J. BISEXUALITY 554, 555 (2015).
17. See, e.g., Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding “[b]oth
before and after Oncale . . . Title VII does not cover the ‘equal opportunity’ or
‘bisexual’ harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the basis of

sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the other; he is treating both sexes
the same” (emphasis in original)).
18. THE NAT’L LGBT WORKERS CTR., LGBT PEOPLE IN THE WORKPLACE 1–2
(2019)
http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/LGBT-Workers-3-Pager-FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XQX6-PUKN].
19. Id. at 2.
20. Id.
21. MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, WHERE WE CALL HOME: LGBT PEOPLE
IN RURAL AMERICA 2–6 (2019), http://www.lgbtmap.org/file/lgbt-rural-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y4YC-678W].
22. Id.
23. See Leila Fadel, New Study: LGBT People A ‘Fundamental Part of The Fabric
NAT’L
PUB.
RADIO
(Apr.
4,
2019),
Of
Rural
Communities’,
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/04/709601295/lgbt-people-are-a-fundamental-part-ofthe-fabric-of-rural-communities [https://perma.cc/JZ9E-WC8Y]; see also Caitlin
Rooney & Laura E. Durso, The Harms of Refusing Service to LGBTQ People and
Other Marginalized Communities, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/reports/2017/11/29/443392/harmsrefusing-service-lgbtq-people-marginalized-communities/
[https://perma.cc/99MBYR5B].
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discriminatory practices.24 In fact, “sex” as a protected category was
added to the Civil Rights Act with a last-minute amendment
introduced by Howard Smith of Virginia, an opponent of the overall
bill.25 While commentators have derisively suggested that “sex” was
added to the Civil Rights Act merely as a joke, or as a way for
representative Smith to derail the efforts to combat race
discrimination, that interpretation ignores the genuine coalition of
conservative National Woman’s Party-aligned politicians and liberal
Equal Rights Amendment advocates that secured its passage in both
chambers of Congress.26
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has
consistently decided that the legislative history of Title VII’s
prohibition on “sex” discrimination is of limited interpretive value.27
Instead, the Court actively chose not to give weight to the legislative
history and instead interpreted the statute on their own, exploring the
parameters of what constitutes sex discrimination. Part I summarizes
this exploration, focusing on where the court has openly expanded
“sex” beyond the enacting Congress’s intent, citing fidelity to the law’s
broad text, as seen in the sexual harassment context. At the same time,
Part I will evaluate explicit congressional overrides of opinions where
the Court chose to construe Title VII narrowly, such as in the
pregnancy discrimination context.28
A. Pregnancy Discrimination: A “Strongly Sex-Related” Trait
In the early years following Title VII’s enactment, the protracted
legislative history around Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination
was invoked to constrain the reach of sex discrimination doctrines.29

24. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971).
25. Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 137, 150–51 (1997).
26. Id. at 149–52.
27. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 143 (1976) (“[T]he legislative
history of Title VII’s prohibition of sex discrimination is notable primarily for its
brevity.”); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (noting “the
bill quickly passed as amended, and we are left with little legislative history to guide us
in interpreting the Act’s prohibition against discrimination based on ‘sex’”).
28. Compare Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, 523 U.S. 75 (1998)
(expanding Title VII’s prohibition on sexual harassment to include acts of same-sex
harassment) with Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 143 (finding that pregnancy discrimination was
not covered by Title VII’s sex discrimination provision).
29. See, e.g., Corne v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975)
(finding that sexual harassment was not a form of sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII, and citing its “little” legislative history). “[It] would be a potential federal
lawsuit every time any employee made amorous or sexually oriented advances toward
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While six circuit courts unanimously interpreted Title VII to include
pregnancy discrimination as a form of sex discrimination, the Supreme
Court rejected this theory when it first heard a pregnancy
discrimination case.30 In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, the Supreme
Court upheld a disability plan provided to employees that had a single
exclusion from its coverage: pregnancy-based disabilities.31 Many of
the arguments made by Justice Rehnquist in his majority opinion echo
the dissents in Hively v. Ivy Tech and Zarda v. Altitude Express.
For instance, according to the majority opinion written by
Rehnquist, the offending disability benefits program in Gilbert
“divide[d] potential recipients into two groups — pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes.”32 Therefore, there was no
risk insured by the program from which men were protected and
women were not, and there was not a sufficient nexus between
pregnancy and gender such that discrimination based on the pregnancy
was per se gender discrimination.33 In the context of sexual
orientation, the dissenting opinions in Hively and Zarda similarly
argue that discriminating based on sexual orientation does not create a
“risk” that disadvantages or privileges only one sex — but merely
creates subcategories of sexes.34
Justices Brennan and Marshall authored a dissent in Gilbert
rejecting such a narrow view of “discrimination” in the Title VII
context.35 First, their dissent notes that the “broad social objectives
promoted by Title VII” were “incompatible” with such a narrow view
of what constitutes discrimination.36 Second, even though pregnancy
discrimination was not discrimination against all women, it would

another. The only sure way an employer could avoid such charges would be to have
employees who were asexual.” Id. at 163–64.
30. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 145–46.
31. See generally id.
32. Id. at 135.
33. Id.
34. Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2018) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting) (“Title VII . . . is aimed at employment practices that differentially
disadvantage men vis-à-vis women or women vis-à-vis men. Discrimination against
persons whose sexual orientation is homosexual rather than heterosexual . . . is not
discrimination that treats men and women differently.”); Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty.
Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 370 (7th Cir. 2017) (Sykes, J., dissenting) (arguing “sexualorientation discrimination does not classify people according to invidious or
idiosyncratic male or female stereotypes. It does not spring from a sex-specific bias at
all”).
35. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. Id.
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“offend[] common sense to suggest . . . that a classification [based on
pregnancy] is not, at the minimum, strongly ‘sex related.’”37 In other
words, rather than focus on the creation of a disparate impact between
men and women, Brennan’s view of Title VII saw discrimination
wherever strongly sex-linked classifications were deployed to
selectively disadvantage subcategories of a protected class.
Congress acted swiftly to overturn the majority’s interpretation in
Gilbert with the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), passed a mere
two years after the decision.38 The legislative history of the PDA
makes Congress’s distaste for the Supreme Court’s narrowing of Title
VII’s protections clear.
Harrison Williams, Chairman of the
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, wrote in a foreword to
the bill’s final committee reports that “the [Gilbert] Court contravened
the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII . . . that all individuals be
fully protected against unjust discrimination.”39 Senators who had
previously voted for the Civil Rights Act itself made clear that they did
not see the PDA as expanding Title VII, but clarifying for the skeptical
Court that a broad elimination of sex discrimination had been their
intention when they initially voted for the bill.40
The story of the Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize pregnancy
discrimination as within Title VII’s mandate, followed by swift
congressional rebuke, should be a cautionary tale as the Court
approaches the question of sexual orientation discrimination.41 Today,
even without the PDA’s specific enumeration of “pregnancy” into Title
VII’s text, it would be difficult for one to imagine that pregnancy
discrimination would not fall within sex discrimination.42 However, the
Gilbert majority’s arguments regarding why pregnancy discrimination
did not constitute sex discrimination — that pregnancy lacked a
sufficient sex-specific nexus since many women are not or are never
pregnant43 — would be even stronger today in light of increased
visibility of transgender people. The question remains: Does the now
real, albeit currently rare, phenomenon of legally-recognized

37. Id. at 149 (internal citations omitted).
38. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555 (1978).
39. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, S.
REP. NO. 54-748, at III (1978).
40. Id. at 8.
41. See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018);
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017).
42. Liz Elting, Why Pregnancy Discrimination Still Matters, FORBES (Oct. 30,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lizelting/2018/10/30/why-pregnancydiscrimination-still-matters/#6f1f4bf763c1 [https://perma.cc/N5WX-UET6].
43. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1976).
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transgender men becoming pregnant further undermine the sexspecific nexus of pregnancy discrimination?44 To sustain the concept
that pregnancy discrimination is sex discrimination when men are also
able to become pregnant, discrimination must mean something other
than just exposing “one sex . . . to disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”45
Instead, discrimination should be based on a trait that is “strongly ‘sex
related.’”46
B. Sexual Harassment: Creation of the “Bisexual Harasser” Problem
Eight years after Title VII was amended to include pregnancy
discrimination, the Supreme Court addressed whether claims of sexual
harassment and a hostile work environment were claims of sex
discrimination in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.47 Unlike the case of
pregnancy discrimination, where all the circuit precedent unanimously
supported the broader interpretation of Title VII, a number of courts
had already expressed skepticism that sexual harassment in the
workplace should be considered “discrimination.”48 That said, the
Supreme Court apparently had gotten the message from Congress that
“the phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces
a[n] . . . intent ‘to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women.’”49 While the expanded focus on the entire
spectrum of treatment allowed the Court to recognize sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, its continued emphasis on
the disparate treatment of men and women perpetuated a statutory
absurdity: the so-called “bisexual harasser defense.”50 Essentially,

44. See David Fontana & Naomi Schoenbaum, Unsexing Pregnancy, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 309, 338 (2019).
45. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
46. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 149 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)).
47. 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). In Meritor, a female employee brought an action after
she was fired following years of sexual abuse and rape at the hands of her supervisor.
The employer fired the female employee for an alleged abuse of sick leave. The Court
decided unanimously that pervasive sexual harassment could create a “hostile or
abusive work environment” and constituted cognizable injury under Title VII despite
the lack of tangible economic discrimination. Id.
48. See Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (arguing
“flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability”), rev’d on other grounds,
600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
49. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (internal citations omitted).
50. See Robin Applebaum, Note, The “Undifferentiating Libido”: A Need for
Federal Legislation to Prohibit Sexual Harassment by a Bisexual Sexual Harasser, 14
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 601, 613–15 (1997).
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when a man sexually harasses women in the workplace, which would
generally be considered sex discrimination, the man can then allege he
equally harasses men, and therefore does not discriminate based on
sex.51 In effect, the bisexual harasser is immune from Title VII claims,
rather than subject to claims by both male and female victims.52
Before Meritor reached the Supreme Court, Judge Bork of the D.C.
Circuit authored a dissent, joined by then-Judge Scalia, to rehear the
case en banc.53 In a footnote, Judge Bork highlighted the doctrinal
difficulty that would emerge if sexual harassment were actionable
under Title VII but only if it occurred in a way that discriminated
between the sexes:
[T]his court holds that only the differentiating libido runs afoul of
Title VII, and bisexual harassment, however blatant and however
offensive and disturbing, is legally permissible . . . . That bizarre result
suggests that Congress was not thinking of individual harassment . . . .
If it is proper to classify harassment as discrimination for Title VII
purposes, that decision at least demands adjustments in subsidiary
doctrines.54

Although the Meritor court rejected Bork’s argument that Title VII
was not meant to include sexual harassment, it did not address the
specter of the bisexual harasser defense.55 Rather than update
subsidiary doctrines to establish that liability attaches when there is
pervasive sexual harassment despite “equal opportunity,” the Supreme
Court implicitly allowed the requirement of disparate impact to
persist.56 While some courts have devised individual workarounds to
this theoretical problem by focusing on the so-called bisexual
harasser’s target at a particular time, others continue to recognize the
defense in some shape or form.57 In jurisdictions that recognize the

51. Id. at 615.
52. Id. at 616.
53. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 1333 n.7.
55. See generally Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
56. “The phrase ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a
congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women in the workplace.” Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
“Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of
one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality.” Id. at 67 (emphasis added); see also Harris v. Forklift
Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
57. Compare Tietgen v. Brown’s Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495, 1501
n.10 (E.D. Va. 1996) (suggesting that the bisexual sexual harasser defense may be
overcome by focusing on what sex the bisexual person was targeting at the time), with
Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 403 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that Title VII does not
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defense, one can escape Title VII liability for sexually harassing an
employee by doubling that harm and also harassing someone of a
different sex.58
Twelve years later, during oral arguments in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, the Supreme Court seemed just as confused as the
D.C. Circuit as to the existence of Title VII liability for the bisexual
harasser, consistent with the lower court’s findings.59 There, Mr.
Oncale sued his employer, Sundowner Offshore Services, alleging
sexual harassment by his male supervisor and two male co-workers.60
Mr. Oncale filed a Title VII claim against his employer because the
harassment was pervasive and included verbal and physical threats of
rape.61 Although the question before the Court was whether acts of
same-sex harassment were actionable under Title VII, a significant
portion of the oral arguments were dedicated to the bisexual harasser
problem.62 The Courts extensively discussed a hypothetical posed by
Justice O’Connor about a supervisor “with the unfortunate habit of
patting each employee, male or female, on the fanny every day.”63 The
Justices struggled with whether sex was “relational,” or whether the
discrimination requirement meant that such equal treatment would
render that conduct legal.64
The unanimous opinion authored by Justice Scalia is notable for
what it addresses, but also for what it omits. First, he writes that while
same-sex harassment was “assuredly not the principal evil Congress
was concerned with when it enacted Title VII[,] . . . statutory
prohibitions often . . . cover reasonably comparable evils.”65 Same-sex
harassment, the Court concluded, met the statutory requirements and
therefore, fell within Title VII’s scope.66 Despite the extended
discussion of the bisexual harasser problem at oral argument, the issue
was not included in the opinion, nor was there any discussion of

provide relief against a bisexual harasser that treats “both sexes the same (albeit
badly)”), and Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding
no Title VII violation where employee harassed both male and female colleagues).
58. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403.
59. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (No. 96-568).
60. Sonya Smallets, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services: A Victory for Gay
and Lesbian Rights?, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 136, 137 (1999).
61. Id.
62. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 59.
63. Id. at 20.
64. Id.
65. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
66. Id. at 80.
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whether gross sexual conduct, in and of itself, could constitute
discrimination “because of sex.”67 The Court’s silence is particularly
notable given Scalia’s previous support for Bork’s dissent in Vinson,
which called for either a disavowal of sexual harassment doctrine
altogether or the elimination of the requirement to find discrimination
between the sexes.68 Despite the severe harassment experienced by
Mr. Oncale, there were no women on his team against whom his
treatment could be compared, and it was unclear whether Oncale’s
extension of Title VII protections was broad enough to cover Mr.
Oncale’s case.69 The parties in Oncale settled soon after the decision.70
C. Sex Stereotyping: Remedy for “Acting” But Not “Being” Gay
One relevant theory of sex discrimination advanced by the Hively
and Zarda opinions is that of sex stereotyping, first recognized in the
plurality opinion of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.71 In Price
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court recognized that an employer engages
in sex discrimination by relying on gender stereotypes to make an
employment decision.72 In summarizing why such behavior would be
included under Title VII, the Court characterized Title VII as a “simple
but momentous announcement” that sex is “not relevant to the
selection, evaluation, or compensation of employees.”73
Despite this broad pronouncement, it remains unclear whether
disparate impact between sexes caused by stereotyping is necessary to
sustain a claim of sex discrimination.74 The critical question for Title
VII purposes is “whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members
of the other sex are not exposed.”75 This test, articulated in Justice
Ginsburg’s concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Systems and reaffirmed by
the unanimous Court in Oncale, focuses on sex in a way that reinforces

67. Id.
68. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J. dissenting).
69. Smallets, supra note 60, at 140.
70. Id. at 140 n.33.
71. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 239.
74. Compare Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir.
2006) (upholding different “grooming standards” for male and female bartenders),
with EEOC v. R.G., 884 F.3d 560, 574 (6th Cir. 2018) (explicitly rejecting the need for
a disparate impact between men and women to sustain a sex stereotyping Title VII
claim).
75. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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the gender binary.76 On its face, it ignores the nearly 1.7% of the
population that identifies as intersex.77 Most troublingly, the test
reinforces the need to compare how a standard impacts men relative to
women to find discrimination, no matter how gross or targeted the
offending conduct is.78 In other words, if the stereotypes enforced
impact more than one sex, there is no sex discrimination. This
requirement is no different than in the bisexual harasser problem,
where double discrimination is insulated, and would undermine
contemporary arguments about pregnancy discrimination in light of
the reality of male pregnancy.79 Instead of focusing on the motivating
factor of the discrimination, its magnitude in a vacuum, or its impacts
on perpetuating a particular gender expression, a Harris-style
requirement focuses the inquiry on the discrimination’s impact on the
relative position of only males versus females and only with respect to
one another.80
D. Attempts to Add Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity to Title
VII
Some supporters of Title VII’s expansion toward covering sexual
orientation discrimination generally admit that it is “well-nigh certain”
that sexual orientation was not considered by legislators who enacted
Title VII.81 When the law was enacted in 1964, it was still illegal to be
gay in all but one state.82 The year after Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act, an expanded Democratic majority enacted the
Immigration and Naturalization Act, which made it illegal for “sexual
deviants,” like homosexuals, to enter the country.83 In short, the

76. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25).
77. See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000).
78. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
79. See infra Sections I.A–B.
80. Harris, 510 U.S. at 25 (Ginsberg, J., concurring).
81. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 353 (7th Cir. 2017) (Posner,
J., concurring); see also Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 134 (2d Cir. 2018)
(Jacobs, J., concurring).
82. Illinois was the first state to decriminalize homosexual sodomy in 1961,
following the 1955 recommendations from the American Law Institute for the Model
Penal Code. It would be another ten years until Connecticut became the second state
to do the same in 1971. See Getting Rid of Sodomy Laws: History and Strategy That
Lawrence
Decision,
AM.
CIV.
LIBERTIES
UNION,
Led
to
the
https://www.aclu.org/other/getting-rid-sodomy-laws-history-and-strategy-ledlawrence-decision [https://perma.cc/873A-5R7T] (last visited Apr. 21, 2019).
83. Immigration and Naturalization Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236 (1965) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952)); see Sharita Gruberg, On the 50th Anniversary of
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government viewed discrimination against LGBT persons as an
important regulation applying to a category of people labeled as
“criminals” and “disordered” by state and federal laws.84
Although Oncale protected LGBT Americans from sex
discrimination when targeted by a colleague of the same sex and Price
Waterhouse supplemented protections against being punished due to
sex stereotypes, the circuit courts are still resistant to allowing LGBT
persons to “bootstrap” sexual orientation discrimination claims to sex
discrimination claims.85 As a result, Congress has attempted to amend
Title VII more than 50 times to explicitly include sexual orientation
and gender identity as protected categories.86 The most recent attempt
is the Equality Act, which would add sexual orientation and gender
identity not only to Title VII but also to a variety of other civil rights
laws.87 Unlike previous iterations of the law, such as the 2012–2013
Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), the Equality Act does
not contain a religious exemption and instead provides that the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act may not serve as a defense to
sexual orientation or gender identity-based Title VII claims.88 While
the measure has broad support in the House of Representatives, its
prospects for passage in the Senate remain unclear.89

the INA, Changes Are Needed to Protect LGBT Immigrants, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Mar.
23,
2015),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/lgbt/news/2015/03/23/109534/on-the-50thanniversary-of-the-immigration-and-nationality-act-changes-are-needed-to-protectlgbt-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/ZY77-5AUK].
84. See Gruberg, supra note 83.
85. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2006).
86. See, e.g., Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015); Employment NonDiscrimination Act, S. 815, 113th Cong. (2013); S. 811, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1584,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3285, 108th Cong. (2003); S.
1284, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 2355, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1858, 105th Cong.
(1997); S. 2056, 104th Cong. (1996).
87. The Equality Act, H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Michelangelo Signorile,
LGBT Rights Are Under Attack. America Needs the Equality Act — Urgently, DAILY
BEAST (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.thedailybeast.com/lgbt-rights-are-under-attackamerica-needs-the-equality-acturgently [https://perma.cc/TJ8W-JQNL].
88. Compare 113 CONG. REC. S7901 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2013) (featuring the first
openly lesbian Senator, Tammy Baldwin, stating that “religious organizations are not
touched” by ENDA) with H.R. 5, 116th Cong. (2019) (“The Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 . . . shall not provide a claim concerning, or a defense to a
claim under, a covered title, or provide a basis for challenging the application or
enforcement of a covered title.”).
89. See Nick Martin, Joe Manchin Will Vote Against the Equality Act, Because of
Course He Will, SPLINTER (Mar. 19, 2019), https://splinternews.com/joe-manchin-willvote-against-the-equality-act-because-1833403586 [https://perma.cc/64FT-JH9E].

2020]PROTECTING BISEXUAL VICTIMS INSTEAD OF “HARASSERS” 445
Given the longstanding congressional inaction on the issue of LGBT
workplace discrimination, the circuits diverge on whether and what
kinds of discrimination are actionable under Title VII. While there are
strong textual arguments which contend that LGBT persons are
protected by the current law, many of these arguments rest on
problematic theories that perpetuate gender binarism.
II. HIVELY, ZARDA, AND MONOSEXISM IN PURSUIT OF LIBERATION
The open question of whether a disparate impact between men and
women is necessary to sustain a Title VII claim not only creates
absurdities in existing sex discrimination jurisprudence, but it also
threatens to erroneously establish perceptions that sexual orientation
discrimination and sex discrimination as discrete phenomena. Hively,
Zarda, and Baldwin advance three different theories to support the
position that sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily sex
discrimination.90 These three theories include a comparative test,
associational discrimination, and sex stereotyping.91 While each theory
captures some instances of sexual orientation discrimination within the
existing sex discrimination frameworks, particularly acts against gays
or lesbians, they fail to adequately address discrimination against
bisexuals, asexuals, and other non-monosexual identities.92 This lack
of consideration for cases involving bisexuals is consistent with
repeated bisexual erasure within the LGBT community, and in the law
more generally.93 This Part will explore the limitations of each of the
three theories, with a focus on their inability to capture orientations
which fall outside of binarist assumptions.
A. The Comparative Test

Hively v. Ivy Tech articulates the first theory, the comparative test,
which asks, but-for the employee’s sex, would the same discriminatory
act still have occurred?94 The circuits took issue with the application
of the comparative test as an interpretative tool used to determine the

90. See generally Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 100 (2d Cir. 2018);
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 339 (7th Cir. 2017); Baldwin v.
Foxx, EEOC DOC 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (July 15, 2015).
91. See generally Zarda, 883 F.3d at 100; Hively, 853 F.3d at 339; Baldwin, 2015 WL
4397641, at *5.
92. Elizabeth Childress Burneson, The Invisible Minority: Discrimination Against
Bisexuals in the Workplace, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 63, 64 (2018).
93. See generally Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52
STAN. L. REV. 353, 367 (2000).
94. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345.
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scope of Title VII, rather than a factual one used to determine actual
motive in a particular case.95 Further, the test assumes that men must
be compared to women to qualify as discrimination “based on” sex. In
Hively, the Seventh Circuit applied the test by comparing the plaintiff,
a woman in a same-sex marriage who alleged she was denied a
promotion because of her marriage, to a hypothetical male employee
who was also married to a woman.96 The Court reasoned that but-for
Hively’s sex, she would have been promoted, as the man married to a
woman would not be subject to the same adverse treatment.97
Although this analogy was effective in the case of Hively, a lesbian
woman, it is defective in other scenarios where the plaintiff is not
monosexual.
The specific application of the comparative method by the Second
Circuit in Zarda and Seventh Circuit in Hively also did not isolate a
single motivating variable for the employees’ terminations: sex or
sexual orientation. When the circuits applied the comparative test,
they switched both the sex and the sexual orientation of the plaintiffs,
comparing a gay woman to a straight man in Hively, and a gay man to
a straight woman in Zarda.98 However, to isolate a motivating variable
for a discriminatory action, the courts could have compared the gay
female employee to a gay male employee, and vice versa. Had a court
compared a gay woman to a gay man — holding sexual orientation
constant but changing sex — an anti-gay employer could make the
same adverse decision, thus isolating sexual orientation, not sex, as the
motivating cause for termination. This argument was explicitly
advanced by respondents during oral arguments in Bostock.99
The utility of the comparative test becomes even more suspect when
applied to various bisexual victims of sexual orientation discrimination.
Suppose an employer with anti-LGBT beliefs fires a bisexual woman
upon discovery of her sexual orientation, which was not obvious
because she was engaged to a cisgender man. To determine if this was
sex discrimination under the comparative method, we would change
the sex of the plaintiff, and determine how the employer would treat
the plaintiff if she was a bisexual man engaged to a man. Unlike in

95. See id. at 367 (Sykes, J., dissenting); Zarda, 883 F.3d at 134 (Jacobs, J.,
concurring).
96. Hively, 853 F.3d at 345–46.
97. Id.
98. See id.; Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119.
99. Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Bostock v. Clayton County, 139 S. Ct. 1599
(2019) (No. 17-1623) [hereinafter Bostock Transcript of Oral Argument].
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Hively, where changing the sex of the lesbian plaintiff created a

heterosexual comparator who would not be subject to discrimination,
here, changing the plaintiff’s sex only makes the plaintiff’s queerness
(and the incentive to discriminate) more obvious to the employer. A
comparative test that only compares the treatment of women to the
treatment of similarly situated men therefore fails to isolate sex as a
cause in the case of discrimination against a bisexual person, and
cannot be used to extend Title VII’s protections against sex
discrimination to such cases.
The current formulation of the comparative test also fails to capture
discrimination against bisexuals versus their gay and lesbian
counterparts within its “sex discrimination” umbrella. In the real
world, there is evidence that bisexuals are subjected to more
discrimination in the workplace than even their gay and lesbian
counterparts.100 This may be because bisexual employees can be
victimized by both biphobia and homophobia.101 It may also explain
why only 11% of bisexual employees are “out” to their co-workers,
whereas half of gay men and lesbian are.102 Suppose a gay employer
were to continually harass a female bisexual employee, who is currently
single, but discussing her orientation by restating antiquated tropes
that all bisexuals are merely hiding their “real” homosexual
orientation. The comparative test provides no path to recourse, as
changing the sex of the plaintiff does not make the employer’s remarks
any less likely to occur.
Perhaps the fatal conceit of the current formulation of the
comparative method is that it assumes, a priori, that sex and sexual
orientation can be distinct variables, not functions of one another. Can
one have a sexual orientation without first identifying one’s sex? The
current comparator test, although deployed in Hively to link sex and
sexual orientation, suggests you can separate the two in other cases. If,
instead, sexuality is understood to be a function of sex, it becomes
possible to use not only various sexes (beyond just “men” and
“women”) as comparators, but also different sexual orientations
themselves. If a bisexual victim of employment discrimination can be
compared to a hypothetical heterosexual or homosexual employee,

100. Anne E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, Employment Discrimination Against
Bisexuals: An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 699, 735 (2015).
101. Id.
102. New Report: Bisexual People Face Invisibility, Isolation, and Shocking Rates
of Discrimination and Violence, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT (Sept. 27,
2016), http://www.lgbtmap.org/invisible-majority-release
EFWD].

[https://perma.cc/VV8Z-
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instead of just a man or woman of the “opposite” sex, we can then also
identify any unique ways in which a bisexual person can be
discriminated against.
B. Associational Discrimination
A minority of the circuits follow the second theory finding that
sexual orientation discrimination is necessarily associational
discrimination based on the sex of one’s partner.103 In Hively, the
plaintiff alleged that she was denied a promotion because of the sex of
her partner, and therefore, she was discriminated against on the basis
of her own sex.104 This theory originated in Loving v. Virginia, which
in the case of anti-miscegenation laws, recognized that the “equal
application” of racial classifications was a tool of white supremacy.105
In short, an employer who discriminates against a person in an
interracial marriage is not merely discriminating on the basis of the
employee’s preference in the race of their partner, but is discriminating
on the basis of the employee’s race itself. Associational discrimination
is a rhetorically powerful theory to advance the “sexual orientation
discrimination as sex discrimination” argument, and unlike the
comparative or stereotyping theories, it has not been singled out for
skepticism in supportive opinions.106 Undoubtedly, some of that
strength comes from the previous success of a Loving-style argument
in the same-sex marriage context.107
The consideration of non-monosexual identities in this theory,
unfortunately, undermines its ultimate goal of adequately capturing all
instances of sexual orientation discrimination. Consider an employer
who fires a heterosexual male employee upon discovering that his wife
is bisexual. While that would be a case of clear sexual orientation
discrimination, the associational theory would fail to link the
discrimination to the plaintiff’s sex, because the sex of his partner
conforms to heterosexual relationship norms. In contrast, consider an
employer who fires an asexual employee because of their lack of

103. See Hively, 853 F.3d 345–47.
104. Id. at 347.
105. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1967).
106. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 134 (Jacobs, J. concurring) (expressing skepticism about
application of the comparative method or sex stereotyping to sexual orientation
discrimination but endorsing the associational theory); Hively, 853 F.3d at 357 (Flaum,
J., concurring).
107. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (invoking Loving’s
holdings on the importance of marriage and the interaction of the Equal Protection
and Due Process clauses to guarantee rights to LGBT persons).
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association. The associational theory does not provide a clear pathway
to link the decision to fire the asexual employee to the “sex” of another
person, as opposed to the much broader concept of engaging in
sexuality.
C. Sex Stereotyping
The final theory advanced in Zarda and Hively is that discrimination
against LGBT people is actually discrimination based on
nonconformity with gender stereotypes, referred to a “sexstereotyping.”108 There is both a behavior-based and identity-based
version of this argument.109 A person who acts “stereotypically gay”
may be said to not conform to certain gender stereotypes. For instance,
the effeminate gay man who is singled out as “girly” or “not a real man”
may have a claim for sex stereotyping based on the treatment of his
behavior. However, this theory would not protect LGBT people who
do not act in a “stereotypically gay” way. For example, the concurring
opinion in Zarda rejected the stereotyping claim because there was no
record of gendered remarks or impressions made about the plaintiff’s
sexual orientation.110 Despite the plaintiff’s brief disclosure of his
homosexual orientation to a client, he apparently did not conform to
gay stereotypes and could be described as “straight-passing.”111
This behavior-based iteration of the sex-stereotyping theory creates
an absurdity in which it is illegal to fire someone for “acting”
stereotypically gay, but not for merely being gay.112 For example, a
straight-passing homosexual can be denied Title VII protections
merely by disclosing their sexual orientation, because the
discrimination was not based on a stereotype. In contrast, if a
heterosexual is misidentified as LGBT and thereby discriminated
against, that misidentification, often stemming from sex-stereotypes, is

108. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.
109. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.
110. Zarda 883 F.3d at 135 (Jacobs, J., concurring).
[T]he record does not associate Mr. Zarda with any sexual stereotyping. The
case arises from his verbal disclosure of his sexual orientation during his
employment as a skydiving instructor, and that is virtually all we know about
him. It should not be surprising that a person of any particular sexual
orientation would earn a living jumping out of airplanes; but Mr. Zarda
cannot fairly be described as evoking somebody’s sexual stereotype of
homosexual men.

Id.

111. Id.
112. Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1266 (11th Cir. 2017) (Rosenbaum, J.,
dissenting).
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actionable under Title VII. This creates another absurdity that flows
from the first: straight employees who “act gay” are more protected
than gay employees who “act straight.”
To address this absurdity, the Hively and Zarda opinions suggest
that identifying as LGBT is itself a violation of a gender stereotype,
and therefore, all sexual orientation discrimination is discrimination
because of a failure to conform to sex stereotypes.113 To some extent,
this is not a radical belief, even by courts that disfavor recognizing
sexual orientation as a protected category under Title VII.114
However, because a stereotype of presuming heterosexuality would
theoretically impact and burden men and women equally, judges have
cast doubt on whether heterosexuality can fairly be called a sex
stereotype.115 Indeed, if “exposing one sex to disadvantageous terms
of employment that the other sex is not” remains the critical inquiry,
as in Harris, a theory of both gay men and women violating the same
stereotype of heterosexuality would be insufficient.116 As roughly the
same amount of men and women are non-heterosexual, a stereotype of
heterosexuality would not have a disparate impact on one sex, nor be
an effective proxy to discriminate based on biological sex.117
A theory that homosexuality that inherently violates the stereotype
of heterosexuality also fails to functionally protect the entire spectrum
of sexual orientations. For example, it is unclear whether asexual
people violate a “stereotype” that all persons must be engaged in
sexual relationships. It is also unclear whether a gay employer at an
LGBT organization could, within his or her rights, fire an employee
upon discovering that the employee is heterosexual. In the latter case,
despite obvious sexual orientation discrimination, the employee could
not bring a sex stereotyping claim because they acted in accordance
with the stereotype of heterosexuality.
While hypothetical
discrimination against heterosexuals may not be a concern, this
limitation illustrates the perils of attempting to add an entire protected
class under the umbrella of violating a stereotype of a defined majority.

113. See Zarda, 883 F.3d at 119; Hively, 853 F.3d at 342.
114. Vickers v. Fairfield Med. Ctr., 453 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “all
homosexuals, by definition, fail to conform to traditional gender norms in their sexual
practices” but nonetheless declining to extend a sex-stereotyping theory to a claim of
sexual orientation discrimination).
115. Hively, 853 F.3d at 342 (Sykes, J., dissenting).
116. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
117. See, LGBT Demographic Data Interactive, UCLA SCH. L., WILLIAMS INST.,
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/visualization/lgbt-stats/ [https://perma.cc/SQ9PZMXG] (last visited Feb. 15, 2019) (showing men and women constitute roughly equal
proportions of the U.S. LGBT population).
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D. The Three Theories at Oral Argument
In Bostock and R.R. Funeral Homes, the government and
employees’ attorneys relied on the limitations of the three theories at
oral argument. The argument that sexual orientation discrimination
and sex stereotyping are necessarily linked was boldly advanced when
counsel for Mr. Bostock quoted the en banc Second Circuit in Zarda:
The attempt to carve out discrimination against men for being gay
from Title VII cannot be administered with either consistency or
integrity. In the words of the en banc Second Circuit, it forces judges
to . . . resort to lexical bean counting where they count up the
frequency of epithets, such as “fag,” “gay,” “queer,” “real man,” and
“fem,” to determine whether or not discrimination is based on sex or
sexual orientation. That attempt is futile[.]118

Chief Justice Roberts was the first to suggest that an employer could
hypothetically discriminate against a gay person, as Justice Alito later
says, “behind the veil of ignorance,” without ever discovering their
sex.119 Associational discrimination is deployed as a rebuttal and later
as a hypothetical by Justice Breyer, albeit with a comparison to
discrimination against interfaith couples.120 The comparative test was
primarily assailed by counsel for the employer, who argued that the
“critical inquiry” for Title VII purposes was the Harris test of “whether
members of one sex were being treated worse than members of the
other sex.”121 Here, members of both sexes would be discriminated
against by an anti-LGBT rule. As Justice Ginsburg suggested,
however, this could allow employers that only hire members of one sex
to discriminate freely on issues like marital status — as there would be
no comparison.122 Oncale would always lose his sex harassment claim,
merely because his workplace had no women.123 This also risks
reinforcing the bisexual harasser defense, as a bisexual harasser would

118. Bostock Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99, at 5. This is likely the first
time in the Court’s history that the slur “fag” has ever been used at oral argument. The
word was not invoked during oral argument in Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443 (2011),
a case brought against the Westboro Baptist Church for picketing a funeral with their
signature “GOD HATES FAGS” signs and chants.
119. Id. at 8, 51–52.
120. Id. at 38.
121. Id. at 32.
122. Id. at 57 (referencing Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1196 (7th
Cir. 1971)). In Sprogis, a female stewardess was fired because she was married. Sprogis,
444 F.2d at 1196.
123. See supra Section I.C.
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not impose a burden on male employees that he does not also impose
on female ones.124
III. ALTERNATIVES TO DISPARATE IMPACT-DEPENDENT THEORIES
Given the Court’s apparent flirtation with reinvigorating the Harris
inquiry, it is urgent that we recognize its inconsistent application thus
far and develop alternatives that provide more consistent and just
inquires. This final Part will advance alternative theories that seek to
better include non-monosexual identities in their analysis and to
conceptually link gender identity and sexual orientation
discrimination.
It is no secret that with the retirement of Justice Kennedy and the
appointment of Brett Kavanaugh, LGBT activists are more pessimistic
about their chance of success before the Court.125 At least some
commentators believe that the conservative justices’ emphasis of the
original statutory meaning in recent opinions is foreshadowing a
rejection of expanded Title VII protections for LGBT persons.126
Despite the recent victories in Hively and Zarda, the weight of circuit
precedent still cuts against an LGBT-inclusive view of Title VII.127
124. See supra Part I.
125. See German Lopez, Anthony Kennedy’s Retirement Is Devastating for
LGBTQ
Rights,
VOX
MEDIA
(June
27,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/identities/2018/6/27/17510902/anthony-kennedy-retirementlgbtq-gay-marriage-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/E5DM-VNB2]; Jim Obergefell, I

Brought the Case that Made Same-Sex Marriage Legal. Anthony Kennedy’s
Retirement Threatens All We Have Won, TIME (June 28, 2018),

http://time.com/5324824/supreme-court-anthony-kennedy-obergefell/
[https://perma.cc/K9JF-WYMT]; cf. Masha Gessen, The Dread of Waiting for the
Supreme Court to Rule on L.G.B.T. Rights, NEW YORKER (Apr. 23, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-dread-of-waiting-for-thesupreme-court-to-rule-on-lgbt-rights [https://perma.cc/6834-7SUH]; Eugene Scott, In

Kavanaugh’s Non-Answer on Same-Sex Marriage, Many Heard a Troubling
Response,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
7,
2018),

https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/07/kavanaughs-non-answer-samesex-marriage-many-heard-troubling-answer [https://perma.cc/K2R3-27BQ].
126. Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Just Handed a Big, Unanimous
Victory to Workers. Wait, What?, SLATE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2019/01/gorsuch-arbitration-labor-new-prime-oliveira.html
[https://perma.cc/X625-8R4Q]; see also New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 535
(2019) (urging judges not to freely invest old statutes with new meanings lest they risk
“amending legislation outside the ‘single . . . and exhaustively considered . . . .
procedure’ the Constitution commands” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951
(1983)).
127. See, e.g., Kalich v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 679 F.3d 464, 471 (6th Cir.
2012); Prowel v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 579 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2009); see also
Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Higgins v. New
Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wrightson v. Pizza Hut
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That said, there is still room for optimism as these cases go before the
Supreme Court. That the Hively majority included five Republican
appointees, including Judge Easterbrook, indicates the strength of its
textual argument.128 However, success before the Supreme Court may
require that the Court finally addresses whether discrimination
“because of sex” requires a finding of discrimination between men and
women, or if it can more broadly encompass discriminatory acts
motivated by sex-related traits of the target. With that broader
understanding of what constitutes “because of sex,” the following
rationales could link sex and sexual orientation discrimination in a way
that creates a cause of action under Title VII, but does not reinforce
either the gender-binary nor monosexist ideas by focusing on the
comparative impact of discrimination between men and women.
A. Focus on Flaum: Creating a “Reliance on Sex-Based
Considerations” Standard
In his Hively concurrence, Judge Flaum suggests that the proper
inquiry is not Harris’s focus on “whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to
which members of the other sex are not exposed,” but is instead
whether “gender was a factor in the employment decision.”129 He
suggests this reading is supported not only by the plurality in Price
Waterhouse but is also faithful to the 1991 amendments to the Civil
Rights Act.130 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the 1991
amendments were meant to codify some of the dicta of Price
Waterhouse and overturn the court’s narrowing of Title VII’s
applicability to racial discrimination cases in Wards Cove Packing v.
Atonio.131 The relevant language from the 1991 amendment reads:
“[a]n unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that . . . sex . . . was a motivating

factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also

of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Blum v. Gulf Oil Corp., 597 F.2d 936, 938
(5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
128. Mark Joseph Stern, A Thunderbolt From the 7th Circuit, SLATE (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/04/the-7th-circuit-rules-that-anti-gayemployment-discrimination-is-illegal.html [https://perma.cc/2YNX-MK4Y].
129. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 359 (7th Cir. 2017) (Flaum,
J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
130. See id. at 358–59.
131. “The purposes of this act are . . . to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide
adequate protection to victims of discrimination.” The Civil Rights Act of 1991, S.
1745, 102d Cong. § 3 (1992).
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motivated the practice.”132

This language, Judge Flaum wrote,
establishes a lower threshold for how much “sex” must factor into the
adverse employment decision for there to be Title VII liability. This
lower threshold effectuates the Price Waterhouse plurality’s note that
Congress meant to establish Title VII liability whenever an employer
has “relied upon sex-based considerations.”133 It also bears some
resemblance to the language from the Brennan dissent in Gilbert that
helped shape the Pregnancy Discrimination Act — that pregnancy is at
the very least “strongly sex-related.”134
The “sex-based considerations” or “strongly sex-related trait”
standards, articulated in dicta by the Price Waterhouse plurality,135 and
arguably endorsed by Congress in both 1979 and 1991,136 help establish
liability for sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination in a
way that effectively captures a wider variety of sexual orientations.
One cannot identify the sexual orientation of a person unless one
knows the sexes to which they are attracted.137 This includes nonmonosexual orientations.138 In short, to consider someone’s sexual
orientation when making a hiring decision always involves considering
their sex. Considering sexual orientation therefore runs afoul of Title
VII’s intent to make “sex” irrelevant to the selection, evaluation, or
compensation of any employee.139
Focusing on whether an individual experiences discrimination based
on consideration of their sex, rather than how the alleged
discrimination itself comparatively disadvantaged one sex, is both

132. Id. (emphasis added).
133. Hively, 853 F.3d at 359 (Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241–42 (1989)).
134. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 148–49 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–42.
136. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1978);
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, S. 1745, 102d Cong. § 3 (1992).
137. See Homosexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/homosexual (last visited Jan. 17, 2020) (“[O]f, relating to, or
characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward another of the same sex.”)
(emphasis added); see also Homosexual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014)
(“Of relating to, or characterized by sexual desire for a person of the same sex.”)
(emphasis added).
138. See Bisexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://unabridged.merriamwebster.com/unabridged/bisexual (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“[O]f, relating to, or
characterized by a tendency to direct sexual desire toward both sexes.”) (emphasis
added); Pansexual, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://unabridged.merriamwebster.com/collegiate/pansexual (last visited Oct. 20, 2019) (“Pansexual people are
attracted to all kinds of people, regardless of their gender, sex or presentation.”
(emphasis added)).
139. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240.
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consistent with Title VII and would conclusively end the absurdity of
the bisexual harasser defense.140 First, as Judge Flaum noted in his
Hively concurrence, the Supreme Court stated in City of Los Angeles,
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart that Title VII’s “focus on the
individual is unambiguous.”141 A focus on the individual who
experiences an act of discrimination, rather than on their experiences
compared to those of their colleagues, would eliminate the need to
determine if other sexes had experienced sex-based discrimination.
While this focus on the individual seems to conflict with the Harris v.
Forklift Systems standard reaffirmed in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, neither Harris nor Oncale rebuked Manhart, and the need for
a comparator remained ambiguous.
Elimination of the bisexual harasser defense is another reason to
reject the Harris “disparate treatment” standard in favor of a more
individualized inquiry that focuses on discrimination experienced by
the employee suggested by Price Waterhouse and Manhart. If the focus
of the inquiry turns on how an individual experiences discrimination,
“each [affected] employee’s claim satisfies Title VII on its face, no
matter the sex of any other employee who experienced
discrimination.”142 The bisexual harasser defense would fail under this
inquiry as each act of discrimination or harassment by the hypothetical
bisexual harasser would constitute a complete claim under Title VII.
This shift would bring about the long called-for “adjustment in
subsidiary doctrines” embraced by Judges Bork and Scalia in their
Taylor dissent.143 Elimination of a comparison requirement would
resolve the circuit split over application of Price Waterhouse, making
it clear sex-stereotyping affecting an employment decision is actionable
even if it puts “equal” burdens on men and women. This conceptual
shift would shore-up the sex-stereotyping theory advanced by the
Hively and Zarda courts by eliminating the argument that a stereotype
of heterosexuality imposes that kind of “equal” burden.
B. Sexual Orientation Discrimination Is a Function of Sex
Discrimination
A second way to link sexual orientation discrimination to sex
discrimination is to define “sex” as inclusive of “sexuality” because
140. See Applebaum, supra note 50.
141. Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty. Coll. of Ind., 853 F.3d 339, 359 n.2 (7th Cir. 2017)
(Flaum, J., concurring) (quoting City of L.A., Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 708 (1978)).
142. Id.
143. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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sexuality is a function of sex. This interpretation is not only
contemporary;144 definitions of “sex” contemporaneous to the passage
of Title VII included phrases such as “the whole sphere of behavior
related even indirectly to the sexual functions and embracing all
affectionate and pleasure-seeking conduct.”145 This analysis is related
to the inability to define sexual orientation without reference to “sex,”
but goes further to consider how sexuality and its regulation have been
historically tied in the United States to maintaining gender roles. To a
certain extent, this analysis mirrors (and certainly supports) the third
theory advanced by the circuit courts,146 that punishing homosexuals is
a form of sex-stereotyping, but rather than focusing on defining
stereotypes it focuses on the way that “sex” and “sexual orientation”
have been defined and linked by the state and individuals.
While some courts, including the Supreme Court, consider
discrimination against transgender persons and sexual minorities
discrete phenomena,147 early discriminatory laws targeted the entirety
of the LGBT community using shared labels and tactics in pursuit of
one goal: regulation of sex and gender norms. Early American
sexologists classified cross-dressing persons and sexual minorities alike
as having a “perverted sex” such that “they hate the opposite sex and
love their own; men become women and women become men.”148
Having an “inverted” sex described the individual in totality, and their
sexual conduct was only one aspect of that larger sex inversion.149 The

144. Sex can be defined as either “one’s identity as either female or male” or
“especially the collection of characteristics that distinguish [the sexes],” both
contemporary definitions that support application to gender identity and sex
stereotypes. Sex, AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2019).
145. William Eskridge, Title VII’s Statutory History and the Sex Discrimination
Argument for LGBT Workplace Protections, 127 YALE L.J. 322, 338 (2017) (quoting
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2296 (2d
unabridged ed. 1961)).
146. See Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 119 (2d Cir. 2018).
147. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in three different cases, slating the cases
about sexual orientation discrimination for argument before argument about
transgender discrimination cases. This suggests that the Court considers the question
of whether either form of discrimination is “sex” discrimination as two questions. See
Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes,
Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019); Zarda, 883 F.3d 100.
148. WILLIAM ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
22 (2002).
149. INST. OF MEDICINE OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, COMM. ON LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HEALTH ISSUES AND RESEARCH GAPS AND
OPPORTUNITIES, THE HEALTH OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
PEOPLE: BUILDING A FOUNDATION FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING 33 (2011),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK64806/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK64806.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N3L4-CM8B].
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link between gender roles and defining sexuality at this time was so
strong that men who engaged in a stereotypically “masculine” or
insertive roles during gay sex were not considered “inverts” because
they were “psychologically” fulfilling their prescribed biological
role.150 As municipalities increased their regulation (and prosecution)
of non-heterosexual sex acts, they at the same time increased their
regulation of once-popular drag shows and spaces known to encourage
gender-nonconformity, believing gender and sexual deviation to be
strongly related.151 In the Immigration and Naturalization Act, passed
the year after the Civil Rights Act, homosexuals, bisexuals, and
transgender people alike were described as “sexual deviants.”152 In
short, the history of legally-sanctioned sexual orientation
discrimination in this country is one of enforcing traditional sex roles,
sex stereotypes, and regulating LGBT persons’ expressions of their
own sex.
Discriminatory laws today are more targeted against subsets of the
LGBT community who are more vulnerable, but that does not mean
that sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination do not share
a common foundation. The arguments deployed to deny transgender
people the right to use the bathroom consistent with their gender
identity bear a startling resemblance to those used to justify anti-gay
discrimination. During the debate over a so-called “bathroom bill” in
Texas, a letter signed by hundreds of local pastors expressed concern
for “the privacy, safety and freedom of our women and children.”153
This specter of pro-LGBT laws exposing children to violence — and
the potential of “recruitment” — matches language used by Anita
Bryant during her “Save Our Children” campaign to repeal such
laws.154 Her husband described the campaign to repeal the MiamiDade anti-LGBT discrimination law as “strictly a defensive
measure.”155

150. ESKRIDGE, supra note 148, at 38.
151. Id. at 45.
152. Immigration and Naturalization Act, PUB. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911, 920
(1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2014)).
153. R.G. Ratcliff, “Our Daughters” Used as the Bathroom Bill’s Protection, TEX.
MONTHLY (Aug. 1, 2017),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/burka-blog/daughters-used-bathroom-bills-protection/
[https://perma.cc/2FGK-X4A9].
154. Jay Clark, Gay Rights Fight Shaping Up in Miami, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 1977),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1977/03/27/gay-rights-fight-shapingup-in-miami/e4f596c1-f8e0-4785-b528-599077a478ba [https://perma.cc/3DJQ-HJK7].
155. Id.

458

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVII

There is also abundant social science research that indicates
attitudes about LGBT people are primarily driven by one’s beliefs
about and adherence to proper gender roles. Numerous studies have
found that one’s adherence or belief in “traditional” gender roles are
among the strongest predictors, if not the strongest, of one’s attitudes
towards LGBT persons.156 Some studies have found the link between
traditional gender roles and homophobia to be stronger than between
homophobia and both one’s sexual conservatism and gender role selfconcept.157 In short, at the psychological level, sex and gender are a
consideration when one engages in sexual orientation discrimination.
The linking of sex, sexuality, and gender identity as sharing a
common motivation and history of discrimination prevents the absurd
result that could occur if the Supreme Court were to find either sexual
orientation or gender identity discrimination actionable, but not the
other. While the Supreme Court has decided to separate these
questions between Altitude Express v. Zarda for sexual orientation
discrimination and R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. EEOC
for gender identity discrimination, a pro-LGBT ruling in one case
requires a pro-LGBT ruling in the other to effectuate it. According to
the National Center for Transgender Equality, a mere 12% of
transgender persons identify as heterosexual.158 Therefore, if the
Supreme Court in R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes were to find that
discrimination based on gender identity was actionable under Title
VII, but sexual orientation discrimination is not, it would leave open a
permissible basis to effectively discriminate against 88% of transgender
persons by proxy.159 Considering that those who harbor antitransgender animus often also harbor animus against sexual
minorities,160 the ineffectiveness of only finding one form of
discrimination actionable is not merely a hypothetical problem.

156. See Aubrey Lynne DeCarlo, The Relationship between Traditional Gender
Roles and Negative Attitudes Towards Lesbians and Gay Men in Greek-Affiliated and
Independent Male College Students 59 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Lehigh
University)
(on
file
with
Lehigh
Preserve),
https://preserve.lehigh.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2469&context=etd
[https://perma.cc/ZV27-6NHQ]; see also Julie Nagoshi et al., Gender Differences in
Correlates of Homophobia and Transphobia, 59 SEX ROLES 521, 529 (2008).
157. Michael Stevenson & Barbara Medler, Is Homophobia a Weapon of Sexism?,
4 J. MEN’S STUDIES 1, 2 (1995).
158. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUALITY, supra note 15, at 246.
159. Id.
160. Amy B. Becker et al., Moral Politicking: Public Attitudes toward Gay Marriage
in an Election Context, 14 INTL J. PRESS/POL. 186, 186–92 (2009) (finding that attitudes
about same-sex attraction predicted attitudes about transgender persons).
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Ironically, at oral argument, the Court appeared willing to link the
fate of the sexual orientation and gender identity cases — but for the
wrong reason: in a word, bathrooms. During the arguments in Bostock,
one of the sexual orientation cases, the only hypotheticals posed to
counsel that actually involved behavior in the workplace — rather than
abstractions from behind the veil of ignorance — were about trans
people using bathrooms consistent with their gender identity.
Bathrooms are mentioned 18 times in Bostock, which is one more time
than “bathroom” was mentioned in the immediately following gender
identity case, R.G. & Martin Funeral Homes.161 The irony is only
heightened when one considers that while sexual minorities’ use of
restrooms is no longer of legislative interest to the states, the cruel and
false specter of predators in the “wrong” restroom was historically
deployed against gay men, lesbians, and racial minorities.162
The linking of sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation
discrimination under an umbrella of discrimination meant to reinforce
sex-norms, however, would effectively capture non-omnisexual
orientations and non-binary gender identities. Discrimination against
each of these persons, from the bisexual man to the asexual
transgender woman, is sex-discrimination because that discrimination
itself is historically and psychologically a means of regulating sex and
its expression. If the discrimination is inherently based on sex, and
consideration of traditional gender roles, no comparisons to other
parties are needed, rendering disparate impact inquiries irrelevant.
C. Statistics to Establish Sex-Specific Impacts of Discrimination
If the Supreme Court were to perpetuate the Harris inquiry, as
employer’s counsel at oral argument urged, requiring the sexes to be
exposed to different disadvantageous terms, it could remain possible
to sustain a claim of sex discrimination by looking to data about the
different impacts of anti-LGBT discrimination depending on one’s sex.
While a stereotype of heterosexuality could impose the same command
on both sexes, it does not mean both sexes feel the effects of that
command equally. For instance, gay men on average are paid between

161. Bostock Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 99 with Transcript of Oral
Argument, R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes Inc. v. EEOC, 139 S. Ct. 2049 (2019).
162. Sarah Frostenson & Zachary Crockett, It’s Not Just Transgender People: Public
Restrooms Have Bred Fear for Centuries, VOX (May 27, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/2016/5/27/11792550/transgender-bathroom
[https://perma.cc/R3RS-JRFK].
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10 and 32% less than their heterosexual counterparts.163 While lesbian
women do not report similar rates of pay discrimination compared to
their heterosexual counterparts, they experience other forms of
discrimination, such as harassment, at similar rates.164 Internationally,
evidence suggests that gay men are disproportionately discriminated
against in traditionally male-dominated fields, and lesbians are
disproportionately discriminated against in traditionally women-led
fields.165
This data again suggests that, in fact, anti-LGBT
discrimination is driven primarily by sex stereotypes and does not
impact lesbians and gay men the same way within a single workplace.
Bisexuals experience workplace discrimination differently as well,
being uniquely vulnerable to hyper sexualization in the workplace and
experiencing biphobia, sometimes at the hands of gay or lesbian
employees.166 In other words, because of how sexual orientation and
sex discrimination interact, there are, in fact, differences in how sexual
orientation discrimination manifests itself across sex-based lines that
create different “disadvantageous terms” for different sexes.
Ultimately, this solution is sub-optimal because by preserving a
“disparate impact on the sexes” requirement, discrimination based on
sexual orientation may be actionable, but it also allows the absurdity
of the bisexual harasser defense to persist. Further, it is unclear if these
sorts of population-based studies of how different segments of the
LGBT community experience discrimination would be sufficient to
satisfy the Harris inquiry, as different manifestations of discrimination
may not constitute “disadvantageous terms of employment.”
CONCLUSION
Discrimination against LGBT Americans in the workplace is a
longstanding phenomenon.
While the specter of a “Briggs
Initiative”167 designed to categorically deny LGBT persons the right to

163. BRAD SEARS & CHRISTY MALLORY, WILLIAMS INST., DOCUMENTING THE
IMPACT
OF
LGBT
DISCRIMINATION
14
(2011),
https://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/Sears-MalloryDiscrimination-July-20111.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UDR-9DDG].
164. Id.
165. Ali Ahmed et al., Are Gay Men and Lesbians Discriminated Against in the
Hiring Process?, 79 S. ECON. J. 565, 565 (2013).
166. Ann E. Tweedy & Karen Yescavage, Employment Discrimination Against
Bisexuals: An Empirical Study, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 699, 731 (2015).
167. The Briggs Initiative was a proposal by California State Senator John Briggs
that would have mandated the firing of any gay teacher or any teacher who supported
gay rights. Initially, the ballot initiative received a significant majority of support in
public opinion polls. However, the measure was eventually defeated 58% to 42% after
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hold a particular job is no longer front of mind, the reality remains that
an LGBT person can now “be married on a Sunday and fired on a
Monday” in most states.168 Even if the majority of LGBT Americans
live in urban areas with generally more accepting attitudes of sexual
and gender minorities, they are still regularly victimized regardless.169
The opinions of the Hively and Zarda courts represent encouraging
recognition that Title VII’s broad text reaches more than
discrimination that only targets men or women in a vacuum. However,
lasting success before the Supreme Court may require elimination of
the longstanding disparate impact requirement in sex discrimination
cases. This shift in doctrine, which can be rooted in precedent and later
congressional amendments, opens the door for other theories of sexual
orientation discrimination as sex discrimination that do not perpetuate
the Court’s silence on non-monosexual identities.
The new
individualized inquiries — either (1) whether a person was
discriminated against and their sex was a factor; or (2) whether the
discrimination experienced by the individual was driven by adherence
to traditional sex-roles — not only will protect the previously invisible
bisexual victim of employment discrimination but would also finally
erase the bisexual harasser defense.
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